上海晟杰文化传播:美中对峙的焦点何在？

美中对峙的焦点何在？A heated exchange英国《金融时报》 艾伦·贝蒂
 Europe’s economic conflagration is generating more than just horrified fascination from the world’s policymakers. The weakness radiating from the eurozone has the potential to inflame existing tensions elsewhere. In the US, though the administration and Congress are casting an increasingly worried eye on the region, the continued irritation of China’s actions on currency and trade remains one of their main preoccupations.
欧洲的经济“火灾”不止是引来全球政策制定者吃惊的关注，欧元区溅出的疲软“火花”还有可能引爆世界其它地区已有的紧张局势。然而在美国，尽管政府和国会日益不安地盯着欧洲地区，但一直让他们关注和烦恼的主要问题之一，依然是中国在汇率和贸易方面的行动。
If the American economy stalls and unemployment remains high as the US heads into an election year, Capitol Hill’s patience is likely to wear thin, and fears of an all-out international trade war will rise.
美国将于明年举行大选。如果美国经济增长停滞、失业率居高不下，那么国会的耐心很可能会消耗殆尽，全球爆发全面贸易战的可能性将会上升。
Several potential flashpoints remain. Although Beijing unpegged the renminbi from the dollar in June 2010, it has allowed only a small appreciation this year. And despite some reform of its “indigenous innovation” policy, aimed at creating high value-added industries, China retains an array of domestic interventions including subsidies, procurement controls and the compulsory transfer of technology by foreign companies.
几个潜在的引爆点依然存在。尽管中国政府在2010年6月放弃了人民币盯住美元的汇率政策，但人民币今年仅有小幅升值。尽管中国对旨在打造高附加值产业的“自主创新”政策进行了一些调整，但它对内仍保留了一系列干预措施，比如补贴、采购控制和强制外国公司转让技术。
Yet US officials argue they are making some progress with a nuanced and flexible approach, taking opportunities as they arise and trying to work with Chinese reformers rather than endlessly seeking confrontation.
“两条腿走路”
不过美国官员声称，他们通过微妙而灵活的方式取得了一些进展，抓住了涌现出的机遇，并努力与中国改革派合作，而不是无休止地寻求对抗。
“We are following a dual approach – trying to bring China into the international system and get it to take responsibility for being one of a small group of countries responsible for making the international system work well,” says one senior administration official. “And, at the same time, push them hard when they take actions that contravene the rules.”
一位美国政府高官表示：“我们正在两条腿走路，一方面努力让中国融入国际体系、使其成为负责让该体系顺利运转的少数国家之一、并为此承担责任，另一方面在他们违反规则时向他们施加压力。”
Although the US administration has been trying to widen the front of its engagement with Beijing, it is still the currency that most exercises Capitol Hill. China’s current account surplus, which American lawmakers say largely reflects undervaluation of the renminbi, has fallen from more than 10 per cent relative to Chinese gross domestic product in 2007 to a likely level of about 4 per cent this year. Nonetheless, many on Capitol Hill claim that currency manipulation to support China’s exporters has maintained global imbalances.
尽管美国政府一直在努力扩大与中国政府的接触，但最让美国国会烦恼的仍然是汇率问题。中国经常账户盈余（美国议员称这在很大程度上反映出人民币被低估）占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例，已从2007年的逾10%降至今年可能性很大的4%左右的水平。但美国许多议员表示，中国操纵汇率以支持出口商的做法仍使全球处于失衡状态。

This year China is likely to permit appreciation of less than 5 per cent, which would still leave the renminbi substantially undervalued by most estimates, though such calculations are rejected by Beijing. The Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington-based think-tank, says the renminbi remains 24 per cent below fair value against the dollar. Easing inflationary pressures and signs of slowing growth have reduced the incentive for China to allow faster appreciation to cool the domestic economy.
今年人民币的升值幅度很可能不到5%。按照多数人的估计，这意味着人民币仍被大幅低估，尽管中国政府并不认可此类估算。总部位于华盛顿的智库——彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)表示，人民币兑美元汇率目前仍比公允水平低24%。中国通胀压力逐渐缓解，再加上有迹象显示经济增长正在放缓，因此中国加快人民币升值以给国内经济降温的动力有所减弱。
The US has used a mixture of bilateral and plurilateral diplomacy to try to persuade Beijing that its interests lie in allowing appreciation; Washington has sought to corral a supporting posse among the Group of 20 leading economies.

美国运用双边和多边外交手段努力让中国政府相信，允许人民币升值符合中国自身利益；美国政府还寻求争取20国集团(G20)成员国的支持。
Politicking in Washington has handed the administration a further, though potentially dangerous, negotiating tool: the threat of currency tariffs. In October, the Senate passed a bill that would compel the US to use calculations of currency undervaluations when assessing to what extent imports are deemed to be unfairly priced, for the purposes of imposing emergency so-called “antidumping” and “countervailing duty” tariffs. Almost all the plausible Republican candidates for the presidential nomination say they support the bill.
美国国内的政治活动为政府增添了一个谈判工具（尽管使用该工具可能招致危险）：以“汇率关税”相威胁。今年10月，美国参议院通过法案，要求美国政府在评估进口商品的定价不公平程度时，估算商品生产国货币被低估的情况，以便加征所谓的“反倾销”和“反补贴”紧急关税。几乎所有有望赢得总统候选人提名的共和党人都表示支持该法案。
The White House appears to be trying to use the bill as a threat, saying it shares its aims while expressing vague concerns about its legality under World Trade Organisation rules. This nuanced position irritates the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives; it says the proposal threatens an out-and-out trade war, and is resisting Democrats’ pressure to bring similar legislation to a vote in the House.

美国政府似乎只是在用该法案进行威胁，它一方面表示认同该法案的宗旨，另一方面含糊地表示担心该法案是否符合世贸组织(WTO)规则。这种微妙的立场激怒了众议院中的共和党领导层；它表示该法案可能引发一场全面贸易战，并顶住民主党施加的压力、不在众议院就类似的法案进行表决。

Some experts agree that such threats can be counterproductive. Nick Lardy of the Peterson Institute says direct confrontation merely weakens the position of those in the Chinese system – such as the central bank – arguing privately for greater currency flexibility. “Other departments and agencies can say to the [central bank]: you are just kowtowing to western interests,” he says.
He reckons the administration’s other tactic – organising a coalition of sympathetic countries – is probably more fruitful, playing on China’s unwillingness to appear isolated. Washington has many natural allies in the G20. Brazil, in particular, has also been exercised about the renminbi.
一些专家同意此类威胁可能适得其反的观点。彼得森国际经济研究所的尼克?拉迪(Nick Lardy)表示，直接对抗只会让那些私下里主张扩大人民币汇率灵活性的中方部门（比如中国央行）陷入不利境地。拉迪说：“其它部门和机构可能会对中国央行表示，你们完全是在听命于西方利益集团。”
拉迪认为，美国政府的其它策略（组织起一个敦促人民币升值的国家联盟）可能更有效果，那会让中国因不愿让人民币升值而陷入孤立。美国在G20中有许多天然盟友，尤其是巴西——后者也对人民币汇率感到不安。
But events elsewhere in the global economy are conspiring to weaken the campaign. Rising risk aversion among investors has recently reversed capital flows into China and weakened the renminbi. And in Europe, some officials still hope that China will help a eurozone rescue effort and so have little incentive for confrontation.
Currency has always been a hard point to press. There are few laws governing global exchange rates. By contrast, the trade in goods and services – and the associated issues of procurement, foreign investment, intellectual property rights and domestic regulation – has a variety of avenues that can be explored without touching off a diplomatic explosion. True, the tapestry of trade law has large holes but the rules of the WTO, which China joined nearly 10 years ago, do have some constraining effect.
但全球其它地区发生的经济事件正在合力削弱上述策略的效力。投资者日益增长的避险情绪最近已导致资本流入中国的趋势发生逆转，并促使人民币汇率走低。在欧洲，一些官员仍希望中国为欧元区纾困出一把力，因此不愿与其发生正面冲突。
国际社会一直很难就汇率问题向某国施压。管理全球汇率的法律也少之又少。相比之下，在商品服务贸易和与之相关的采购、外国投资、知识产权及国内监管等议题上，各国却拥有多种手段可以探索使用、又不致引发外交争端。没错，贸易法律框架存在着巨大的漏洞，但中国已加入近十年之久的WTO所制定的规则，仍可起到一定的约束作用。
The US administration cites a string of actions it has taken. These include WTO litigation against China’s own use of antidumping and countervailing duty import taxes on US exports, and the initiation of a wide-ranging investigation by the administration of Beijing’s support for its renewable energy industry. In this case, China pre-emptively abolished a programme subsidising its wind power industry.
“Once the potential for litigation is raised, to date there has been about a 50 per cent record of China taking an action to comply with its obligations before it actually goes through the dispute settlement process,” says Tim Reif, general counsel at the US trade representative’s office.
美国政府已就此采取了一系列行动，其中包括：就中国对从美国进口的商品加征的反倾销和反补贴税，在WTO起诉中国；发起针对中国政府扶持本国可再生能源行业的广泛调查。在这种情况下，中国主动废除了一项补贴本国风电行业的计划。
美国贸易代表办公室(USTR)总法律顾问蒂姆?赖夫(Tim Reif)表示：“自从争端可以通过诉讼途径解决以后，到目前为止，在50%左右的情况下，中国在案件实际进入争端解决程序前就会主动采取行动、履行义务。”
Washington has also initiated cases with an eye to establishing useful precedents. Recently, it brought an action against Chinese antidumping and countervailing duties on US chicken exports. Poultry may not be the most glamorous or the highest value-added of exports but, since the case has broader connotations, it could prove a useful one. “China has been using antidumping and countervailing duties as a retaliatory measure,” says Mr Reif. “Part of the reason for bringing this action is to prevent their use as retaliation.”
Legal process is not without its problems. One is the limited coverage of WTO rules. China, for example, has placed much of its giant public procurement market off-limits to foreign companies. It also has yet to fulfil a promise to join the WTO’s government procurement agreement, a standalone pact separate from the body’s normal rules. Beijing has promised by the end of the year to make a fresh bid to join the agreement, but US businesses doubt its commitment.
美国政府提起诉讼时还着眼于确立有用的判例。近期，美国政府就中国对从美国进口的鸡肉加征反倾销和反补贴关税提起了诉讼。禽肉或许不是最耀眼或附加值最高的出口商品，但鉴于这个案子具有更广泛的意义，这么做或许是有价值的。“中国一直把反倾销和反补贴关税作为报复手段，”赖夫说，“之所以就此案提起诉讼，部分原因就是为了防止中国利用这类关税实施报复。”
走法律程序也有一些缺陷。其中之一就是，WTO规则的覆盖面有限。比如说，中国庞大的政府采购市场大部分不向外资企业开放。中国迄今仍未履行加入WTO《政府采购协议》的承诺，该协议是独立于WTO常规规则之外的单独协议。中国政府承诺在今年年底前递交加入该协议的新提议，但美国商界对其是否会履行承诺表示怀疑。
Furthermore, the low-hanging fruit has already been harvested. The relatively easy cases have already been brought; bringing future actions is likely to be harder – not least because of the lack of information on Chinese subsidies and regulatory practices. Washington recently complained to the WTO that Beijing was failing to provide required information on its subsidies, but it has limited recourse in this area.
Business groups say American companies are also often reluctant to provide the US government with the information needed to bring cases, concerned about official retribution against their operations in China. The request for the renewables probe came from the US United Steelworkers’ Union rather than a business. In a recent antidumping and countervailing duty action brought against imports of Chinese solar cells by US renewable energy businesses, six of the seven complainants exercised their rights to keep their identities secret.
另外，容易摘的果子已经摘完了。一些相对容易取胜的案子已经提交，因此，未来的诉讼行动很可能更加困难——特别是因为中国在补贴和监管操作方面缺乏信息透明度。美国政府最近向WTO投诉，称中国政府未能提供补贴方面的必要信息，但在这个问题上，美国没有多少可用的手段。
商业团体表示，美国企业常常也不愿向美国政府提供起诉所必需的一些信息，原因是担心中国政府会对它们在中国的业务实施报复。对中国可再生能源行业展开调查的请求是由美国钢铁工人联合会(United Steelworkers' Union)提出的，而非由某家美国企业提出的。最近，7家美国可再生能源企业对从中国进口的太阳能电池提起反倾销和反补贴关税诉讼，但其中6家企业都行使了匿名权。
Washington is coming under pressure to adopt a more confrontational stance on this issue. “Providing information to [the US trade representative] is a costly exercise both in terms of the resources involved and the potential for tit-for-tat retaliation,” says Bill Reinsch, who chairs the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which reports annually to Congress. He believes US administrations, which have traditionally brought cases only when they consider themselves very likely to win, should file more long-shot actions to keep up the pressure on Beijing. The US could, he says, bring “nullification or impairment” actions, which argue broadly that China’s trading partners have not received the benefits they might have reasonably expected from its entry into the WTO.
在这个问题上，美国政府正面临越来越大的压力、要求它采取更加强硬的立场。美中经济与安全评估委员会(US-China Economic and Security Review Commission)主席比尔?赖因施(Bill Reinsch)说：“向（美国贸易代表）提供信息的代价很高，既要为此动用一些资源，又有可能招致以牙还牙的报复。”该委员会每年要向美国国会提交一份报告。赖因施认为，美国政府应该改变只在赢面很大时才提起诉讼的传统做法，提起更多胜算较低的诉讼，保持对中国政府的压力。他说，美国政府可以以利益“丧失或减损”(nullification or impairment)为由提起诉讼，这只需泛泛宣称中国的贸易伙伴们未能得到中国入世本应带给它们的合理收益。
America’s final tactic for dealing with China is to set up trade deals with groups of countries, and hope China will feel compelled to join. Recently the US agreed an outline pact in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a grouping of nine countries – including Vietnam, which has extensive Chinese-style state intervention – with the aim of concluding a deal by the end of next year. Washington is also exploring the idea of creating more plurilateral agreements in the WTO on the lines of the government procurement agreement.
美国对付中国的最后一招是，召集多个国家签订贸易协议，让中国感受到压力，觉得不得不加入进来。最近，美国同意了《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（Trans-Pacific Partnership，简称TPP）的纲要协议。TPP的成员国有9个，其中包括中国式国家干预作风盛行的越南。该集团的目标是，在明年年底前谈判达成一项协议。美国政府还在探索这样一种构想：在WTO内构建更多类似于《政府采购协议》的多边协议。

“China needs to understand that they are welcome to join future developments, such as plurilateral agreements in the WTO, or the [TPP], says Dan Price of Rock Creek Global Advisors and a former senior White House international economics official. “But those will go ahead whether it decides to participate or not.” However, the countries involved in the TPP collectively account for only about 6 per cent of US trade, so China is unlikely to feel compelled to join or lose all its export markets to American companies any time soon.
No one ever said persuading the world’s largest goods exporter to change its strategy would be easy. The US administration says China will move when it accepts that international commerce is not a zero-sum game, and that its maturing economy will benefit from a wider set of trade rules. Bringing this about will take time but, with America’s negotiating leverage limited, it looks like the most realistic strategy.
“We have to be able to show China that it is in its own interest to take a particular action,” a US official says. “We need to find lines to push for that seize the moment.”
“中国必须明白，我们欢迎中国参与未来的进程，比如WTO内的多边协议或TPP，”前白宫国际经济高级官员、Rock Creek Global Advisor的丹?普莱斯(Dan Price)表示，“但无论中国参不参与，这些进程都会向前发展。”不过，目前加入TPP的那些国家对美贸易额的总和只占美国对外贸易额的6%，因此，中国不大可能感到不得不加入进来，美国企业也不大可能在短时间内抢走中国的所有出口市场。
从来没有人说过，说服世界最大的商品出口国改变策略是件轻而易举的事情。美国政府表示，国际商业活动并非“零和”游戏，更完善的贸易规则会令日益成熟的中国经济受益，中国政府若接受这两个观点就肯定会作出改变。促使中国政府作出改变的确需要时间，但考虑到美国的谈判筹码不多，一步步做说服工作似乎是最现实的策略。
“我们必须能够证明给中国看，采取某项行动符合其自身利益。”一位美国官员表示，“我们需要想方设法，敦促中国不要错失机会。”
SIDE BAR: Amid a slow renminbi rise, some in Beijing back further reform附：中国政府各部门在汇改问题上的分歧
To Beijing’s unelected leaders, the political cycle of criticism emanating from Washington over China’s trade and currency policies has grown tiresome, writes Jamil Anderlini . US politicians’ fixation on the value of the renminbi is “not just a case of bad maths, but an example of a political tactic that is often used to distract citizens from domestic problems”, thundered an article in state media last month.
Chinese policymakers uniformly reject claims that their currency is undervalued, and that it is responsible either for distortions and imbalances in global trade or for America’s economic problems. But behind the show of unity, different parts of the government hold a wide range of views on the issue that reflect internal political divisions.
In public, all officials argue that the real exchange rate of the renminbi has risen 40 per cent (about 23 per cent in nominal terms) against the dollar since July 2005, even as the US jobless rate increased from 7 per cent to more than 9 per cent over the same period.
They also point out that before the renminbi was put on a gradual appreciation track, from 2005, Washington estimated that the currency was undervalued by as much as 40 per cent, or roughly the amount it has appreciated in real terms already.
华盛顿方面对中国贸易和汇率政策展开的一轮又一轮政治批评，已经让北京方面的非民选领导人感到厌倦。上个月，中国官方媒体的一篇文章厉声抨击道，美国政客抓住人民币汇率问题不放，不仅是因为他们数学太差，而且还代表着一种惯用的政治伎俩，用来把美国民众的注意力从国内问题上引开。
中国的政策制定者一致否认关于人民币币值被低估的指责，也否认人民币汇率对全球贸易扭曲和不平衡、或对美国经济的问题负有责任。但在表面团结的背后，中国政府各部门对于这一问题却有着各式各样的看法，这也体现出中国政府内部的政治分歧。
在公开场合，所有官员都声称，自2005年7月以来，人民币兑美元实际汇率已上升了40%（名义汇率上升了23%左右），尽管同期美国失业率从7%升至9%以上。
他们还指出，在人民币自2005年起步入逐步升值轨道以前，华盛顿方面曾估计，人民币被低估了40%，这一幅度与人民币实际汇率迄今的升幅大致相当。
But many in the government and the Communist party believe China must introduce a more flexible exchange rate mechanism, and that this would help to address international and domestic imbalances. The most prominent advocate is the central bank, led by Zhou Xiaochuan, its urbane governor.

The central bank is charged with intervening in currency markets to keep the value of the renminbi within a narrow band, and also with managing the enormous foreign exchange reserves built up as a result. It must also manage liquidity in the bubble-prone domestic economy while trying to micromanage lending in the state-owned banking sector.
For years, Mr Zhou and his colleagues have been quietly lobbying for reforms on currency and interest rates. But the central bank is not independent, and is relatively weak compared with many other branches of the government.
Among the departments that oppose currency reform and appreciation, the ministry of commerce appears the most vehement. It is charged with overseeing the powerful export sector and lobbying for manufacturers that see themselves being squeezed from all directions – by rising costs, a shrinking labour pool and stricter labour and environmental standards as well as an appreciating renminbi.
但中国政府和党内的许多人士认为，中国必须引入更灵活的汇率机制，这将有助于解决国际和国内的不平衡问题。在这方面，最突出的倡导者是温文尔雅的周小川行长领导的中国央行。
中国央行负责对外汇市场进行干预、确保人民币汇率在一个狭窄的区间内波动，另外也负责管理由此累积下来的巨额外汇储备。它还必须在努力对国有银行部门的放贷行为进行微观管理的同时，管理易于产生泡沫的国内经济中的流动性。
多年来，周小川及其同事一直在低声游说当局实施汇率和利率改革。但中国央行没有独立性，与中国政府其它许多部门相比，处于相对弱势的地位。
在反对汇率改革和人民币升值的部门当中，商务部的反对似乎是最强烈的。商务部负责监管强大的出口部门，并为制造商们说话——这些制造商认为自己承受着方方面面的压力，包括成本上涨、劳动力供给减少、劳动与环保标准变严以及人民币升值。