中国最新一个省？

China’s Newest Province?

中国最新一个省？

By VICTOR CHA

VICTOR CHA

Washington 

于华盛顿

NORTH KOREA as we know it is over. Whether it comes apart in the next few weeks or over several months, the regime will not be able to hold together after the untimely death of its leader, Kim Jong-il. How America responds — and, perhaps even more important, how America responds to how China responds — will determine whether the region moves toward greater stability or falls into conflict. 

我们所了解的北韩已经完了。无论是在数周还是数月内垮台，领导人金正日匆匆死亡后，该政权将没有能力继续团结一致。美国怎样应对？——也许更重要的是，美国如何应对中国采取的应对措施——将决定这一地区走向更加稳定，还是陷入纷争。

Mr. Kim’s death could not have come at a worse time for North Korea. Economically broken, starving and politically isolated, this dark kingdom was in the midst of preparations to hand power over to his not-yet-30-year-old son, the untested Kim Jong-un. The “great successor,” as he has been dubbed by the state media, is surrounded by elders who are no less sick than his father and a military that chafed at his promotion to four-star general last year without having served a day in the army. Such a system simply cannot hold. 

对北韩来说，金正日去世的时机糟糕到无以复加的地步。经济崩溃，饥荒遍布，政治孤立，这个黑暗的王国又处于准备向年龄不到30岁，而且从未经受过考验的金正恩交权的过程之中。这位被该国国家媒体称为“伟大继承者”的人，身边是被与他的父亲一样病入膏肓的老人们以及对他没有军队服役过一天去年却被提拔为四星大将一事感到恼火的军人们。这样的体制根本是无法维持的。

The transition comes at a time when the United States has been trying to get nuclear negotiations back on track. Those efforts have now been replaced by a scramble for plans to control loose nuclear weapons, should the regime collapse. 

权力过度之际，恰逢美国持续努力重启核谈判之时。现在，这些努力已经被制定计划，控制该政权垮台后管理放松的核武器的匆忙努力而替代。

And yet Washington remains powerless. Any outreach to the young Mr. Kim or to other possible competitors could create more problems during the transition, and would certainly be viewed as threatening by China. Since Kim Jong-il’s stroke in 2008, the United States and South Korea have been working on contingency plans to deal with just such a situation, but they all thought they would have years, if not a decade. 

然而，华盛顿却一直无能为力。在过度期间，向年轻的金先生或其他可能的对手伸出的任何橄榄枝都会制造更多的麻烦，也肯定被中国视为威胁。自从金正日2008年患中风后，美国与韩国一直在制定应急计划，以应对这样的形势。不过，他们都认为，如果没有10年的话，至少还需要几年的时间。2

The allies’ best move, then, is to wait and see what China does. Among China’s core foreign-policy principles is the maintenance of a divided Korean Peninsula, and so Beijing’s statements about preserving continuity of North Korea’s leadership should come as no surprise. Since 2008 it has drawn closer to the regime, publicly defending its leaders and investing heavily in the mineral mines on the Chinese-North Korean border. 

因此，盟国最好的举动就是等待，观察中国做些什么。中国核心的外交原则就是维持朝鲜半岛的分裂状态，因此，中国有关维持北韩领导层的连续性的声明不应该让人感到意外。2008年以来，中国与该政权的关系越来越紧密，公开地捍卫其领导人，并在中朝边界的矿山大量投资。

But even as Beijing sticks close to its little Communist brother, there are intense debates within its leadership about whether the North is a strategic liability. It was one thing to back a hermetic but stable regime under Kim Jong-il; it will be harder to underwrite an untested leadership. For Xi Jinping, expected to become China’s president over the next year, the first major foreign policy decision will be whether to shed North Korea or effectively adopt it as a province. 

然而，即便北京与其共产主义小弟弟保持密切关系，中国领导层的内部存在着有关北韩是不是战略包袱的激烈辩论。支持金正日领导下封闭但稳定的政权是一回事情，但要为一个未经考验的领导层提供担保就更难讲了。对明年预期成为中国主席的习近平来说，首要的重大外交决策将是，除掉北韩，还是干脆将其接纳为一个省。

All indications are that Beijing will pursue the latter course, in no small part because of a bias among its leadership to support the status quo, rather than to confront dramatic change. And yet “adopting” North Korea could be dramatic in itself. China may go all in, doling out early invitations and new assistance packages to the young Mr. Kim, conditioning them on promises of economic reform. 

种种迹象表明，北京将执行后一项选择的进程，其中重要的原因就是，中国领导层存在一种支持现状而不愿应对剧烈变化的偏向。然而“接纳”北韩本身也是一种剧烈变化。中国可能会尽力很快向年轻的金先生发生邀请并提供新的救助计划，条件是他们要承诺经济改革。

While some observers hope that Kim Jong-il’s death will unleash democratic regime change, China will work strongly against that possibility, especially if such efforts receive support from South Korea or the United States. Given that Beijing has the only eyes inside the North, Washington and Seoul could do little in response. 

尽管有些观察家希望，金正日的死亡将产生民主政权的更迭，中国却竭力反对这一可能，尤其是如果这种努力受到韩国或美国的支持的话。考虑到北京是北韩内部唯一的眼线，华盛顿与首尔应对的选择性很小。

Yet even China’s best-laid plans may come apart. The assistance may be too little, too late, especially given the problems the new leadership will face. A clear channel of dialogue involving the United States, China and South Korea is needed now more than ever. 

然而，即使中国最周到的计划也存在瓦解的可能。援助力度可能太小，时间太迟，尤其考虑到北韩新领导层所面临的巨大问题。现在比以往任何时间都需要一条包括美国、中国和韩国的清楚的对话渠道。

And yet such a dialogue is completely absent since Kim Jong-il’s stroke. Beijing has deflected every official and unofficial overture from Washington to have quiet discussions on potential North Korean instability. Before, China let its fears of Western interests get the better of it; wiser Chinese judgment should lead authorities to open such a channel now. The three sides should open with a conversation on all our fears about what could happen in a collapsing North — loose nukes, refugee flows, artillery attacks — and how each would respond. 

然而，自从金正日中风到现在，还完全缺少这样一种对话。北京一直对来自华盛顿有关就朝鲜潜在不稳定进行私下商讨的任何官方及非官方建议置之不理。以前，中国是想利用西方对其利益存在的恐惧感；然而现在，中国作出的更为聪明的判断，应该引导当局开启这样的对话渠道。三方必须开始对话，商讨我们对正在垮台的北韩引起的事件——失控的核武器、难民潮等的担心，商讨各方应该采取的应对措施。

With so little known about the inner workings of this dark kingdom, miscalculation by any side in response to developments inside the North is a very real possibility given the hair-trigger alerts of the militaries on the peninsula. 

考虑到朝鲜半岛千钧一发的事态，由于我们对这个黑暗王国内部运作了解甚少，真实的可能性是，任何一方对北韩内部事态的任何进展都可能做出误判。

None of this will be easy. For China, the uncertainty surrounding North Korea comes against the backdrop of Mr. Obama’s “pivot” to Asia and assertion that the region is America’s new strategic priority. This has already created insecurities in Beijing that will make genuine dialogue with the United States even more challenging — and thus all the more necessary. 

所有这些都不容易。对中国来说，围绕北韩产生的不确定性到来的背景是奥巴马将重心移向亚洲以及奥巴马关于该地区是美国新战略优先考虑的重点的断言。这种形势已经在北京产生不安全因素，使与美国展开真正的对话更加富有挑战性，因此也更为必要。

Victor Cha, a professor at Georgetown and author of the forthcoming book “The Impossible State: North Korea, Past, and Future,” was director of Asian affairs at the White House from 2004 to 2007. 

Victor Cha为美国乔治城大学教授，是即将出版的“不可能的过度：过去与未来的北韩”的作者，2004年-2007年曾任白宫亚洲事务主任。