张三丰异界游有几部:中国大萧条(转载)

中国大萧条(转载)

是转载的，也不知道是真的假的。
　　我主要是提个醒，居安思危吧。也许是杞人忧天了，当然我希望祖国昌盛繁荣富强，希望中国百姓（是掌握20%财富的98%的普通老百姓）安居乐业幸福美满！　　
　　即将到来的中国大萧条
　　阮一峰 发表于 2008年10月 8日 | 分类：首页 -> 档案 -> 中国经济 　　
　　
　　连我都觉得，上面的题目太像标题党了。　　
　　但是，实际情况是，这是一个美国人的预言，而且是在2004年9月2日写下的预言。　　
　　正如Peking Duck在2008年10月3日的评论：“他的神奇之处，不在于他全说对了，而在于四年来完全如同他的预测，事情一件接一件地发生。”    （Not because it’s necessarily right, but because it’s fascinating to see where we actually stand four years after the writer’s prediction.）　　
　　请看下面这段话，如果告诉你这是四年前写的，你会不会倒吸一口冷气？　　
　　Unless there is an unforeseen banking, currency, or a derivative crisis spreading throughout the world, it is my belief that the Chinese bust will occur sometime in 2008-2009, since the Chinese government will surely pursue expansionary policies until the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in China. 　　
　　我相信，中国经济的破灭将发生在2008-2009年期间，因为在奥运会之前，中国政府不会放弃经济扩张政策，除非发生了无法预见的全球性银行、货币或者金融衍生品危机。　　
　　By then, inflation will be most likely out of control, probably already in runaway mode, and the government will have no choice but to slam the brakes and induce contraction.　　
　　此后，通货膨胀将失去控制，或者已经失去控制，因此政府不得不踩刹车，使用紧缩政策。　　
　　In 1929 the expansion stopped in July, the stock market broke in October, and the economy collapsed in early 1930. Thus, providing for a latency period of approximately half a year between credit contraction and economic collapse, based on my Olympic Games timing, I would pinpoint the bust for 2009. Admittedly, this is a pure speculation on my part; naturally, the bust could occur sooner or later.　　
　　1929年时，美国经济扩张在7月达到顶点，股票市场在10月开始暴跌，1930年初经济崩溃。这就是说，信用紧缩与经济崩溃之间有半年的时滞。那么基于我的奥运会时间表，我认为中国经济崩溃将发生在2009年。当然，这纯粹是我的推测，实际时间可能提早也可能推迟。　　
　　这位预言者名叫Krassimir Petrov，是美国Ohio州立大学的经济学博士。　　
　　他认为，上个世纪20年代的美国经济与21世纪初的中国经济惊人相似，因此中国经济也会像美国那样，发生1929年式的大萧条。　　
　　1）80年前，美国经济高速增长，空前繁荣；80年后，中国经济高速增长，空前繁荣。　　
　　2）80年前，英镑是世界储备货币，美元盯住英镑；80年后，美元是世界储备货币，人民币盯住美元。　　
　　3）80年前，英镑被高估，美元被人为低估，原因是英国需要低价获得美国的原料和工业品进行扩张，而美国需要更大的市场，以便发展本国工业；80年后，美元被高估，人民币被人为低估，原因是美国过度消费，毫不储蓄，而中国需要用出口拉动经济增长，减少就业压力。　　
　　4）80年前，美国银行大量发放贷款，1929年的货币供应量比1921年增长了61.8%；80年后，中国信用扩张的幅度更加惊人，2008年8月的“货币和准货币供应总量”（M2）是2000年1月的3.77倍。　　
　　5）80年前，美国股票市场出现大牛市，1929年的道指最高点比1919年1月时上涨了600%，房地产价格也暴涨；80年后，中国的上证指数从1000点涨到6000点，涨幅也恰恰是600%。　　
　　80年前，美国最终出现了大萧条，那么80年后的中国呢？……　　
　　从繁荣到萧条，这里面的逻辑有两条：　　
　　一、如果信用的扩张不是基于生产的扩张，而是基于金融资产价格的扩张，那么必然将以资产价格大幅下跌而告终，否则无法将多余的信用排除出经济体系。　　
　　二、如果一国出口的增长不是基于正常的货物交换，而是基于人为压低汇率，那么迟早有一天进口国会无力支付进口，必须靠出口国资助，所以出口国会累积大量债权。而进口国偿还这些债权的方式，必然将是本国货币的大幅贬值，使得债权缩水或消失。　　
　　总之，不管是资产价格的下跌或者外汇的损失，中国的金融部门都将会遭受重大损失，进而引发整个经济的萧条。　　
　　四年前，Krassimir Petrov正是像上面这样推理的。他的结论是：　　
　　it is clear that China travels today the road to Depression. 　　
　　很清楚，中国正在走近萧条。　　
　　How severe this depression will be, will critically depend on two developments. 　　
　　萧条的严重程度，取决于两个因素。　　
　　First, how much longer the Chinese government will pursue the inflationary policy, and second how doggedly it will fight the bust. The longer it expands and the more its fights the bust, the more likely it is that the Chinese Depression will turn into a Great Depression. 　　
　　首先，中国政府刺激经济的政策会持续多久。其次，中国政府抗拒泡沫破灭的意愿有多强烈。刺激的政策越持续，抗拒破灭的意愿越强烈，中国经济的萧条就越可能变成一次大萧条。　　
　　如果他的预测是正确的，就像已经被证明的部分那样，那么1949年后从未在中国出现过的银行破产，明年就将出现。　　
　　而让无数中国青年备感困扰的高房价，明年也将像今年的股票一样暴跌。　　
　　当然，坏事不一定都是坏结果。1929年开始的大萧条，重创欧洲，使得美国成为世界头号强国。而这一次的危机，必然会重创美国，进一步加强中国的地位。　　
　　我感兴趣的问题是，如果一个专制国家发生根本性的社会危机，会带来怎样的后果？一种情况是，1917年俄国被第一次世界大战拖累，经济破产    首先，中国政府刺激经济的政策会持续多久。其次，中国政府抗拒泡沫破灭的意愿有多强烈。刺激的政策越持续，抗拒破灭的意愿越强烈，中国经济的萧条就越可能变成一次大萧条。
　　如果他的预测是正确的，就像已经被证明的部分那样，那么1949年后从未在中国出现过的银行破产，明年就将出现。而让无数中国青年备感困扰的高房价，明年也将像今年的股票一样暴跌。
　　当然，坏事不一定都是坏结果。1929年开始的大萧条，重创欧洲，使得美国成为世界头号强国。而这一次的危机，必然会重创美国，进一步加强中国的地位。
　　我感兴趣的问题是，如果一个专制国家发生根本性的社会危机，会带来怎样的后果？一种情况是，1917年俄国被第一次世界大战拖累，经济破产，于是人民群众冲进了冬宫，沙皇被枪毙。另一种情况是，1933年德国受大萧条影响，失业率达到33%，人民群众渴望一个更强硬更极端的领导人，于是希特勒当选了总理。

CHINA'S GREAT DEPRESSION
by Krassimir Petrov, Ph.D.
September 2, 2004

Having recently completed Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, I couldn’t help draw the parallels between America’s roaring 20’s and China’s roaring economy today, and I couldn’t help conclude that China will inevitably fall in a depression just like America did during the 1930s. The objective of this article is to present an Austrian argument as to why this must happen; to substantiate my arguments, I will be quoting Rothbard’s Fifth Edition where relevant.

Before proceeding any further, I would urge all readers who haven’t read Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, to pick up a copy and read it. First, it is a real pleasant read, and Rothbard’s witty style of writing makes reading it fun. Second, the first part of the book develops the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, which is indispensable for understanding credit booms and their inevitable busts. Finally, the second part of the book elaborates the development and the causes of the Inflationary Boom of the 1920s and provides a basis for comparison with the economic policies of modern-day China.

In order to establish our parallel, we need some historical perspective of the relationship between a world superpower and a rising economic giant. In the 1920s, Great Britain was the superpower of the world, and the United States was the rising giant. As such, Great Britain ran its economic policies independently, and the U.S. adapted its own policies in a somewhat subordinated manner. Today, The United States is the hegemonic superpower of the world, and China is the rising economic giant. Not surprisingly, the U.S. runs its policy independently, while China adjusts its own accordingly.

Continuing our parallel analysis, during the 1920s the British Empire was already in decline, was militarily overextended, and in order to pay for its imperial adventures, resorted to debasing its own currency and running continuous foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, Britain was savings-short, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world was financing her. Meanwhile, America was running trade surpluses and was a net creditor nation. Importantly from a historical point of view, the British Empire collapsed when the rest of the world pulled the plug on their credit and began capital repatriation. Today, the American Empire is in decline, is militarily overextended, and is financing her overextended empire with the “tried-and-true” methods of currency debasement and never-ending foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, America is savings-starved, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world is financing her. At the same time, today China runs trade surpluses and is a net-creditor nation. When the rest of the world finally pulls the plug on American credit, will the American Empire also collapse?

The cause of the Depression, as Rothbard explains, was a credit expansion that fuelled the boom. According to Rothbard, “[o]ver the entire period of the boom, we find that the money supply increased by $28.0 billion, a 61.8 percent increase over the eight year period [of 1921-1929]. This was an average annual increase of 7.7 percent, a very sizable degree of inflation (p.93)…The entire monetary expansion took place in money substitutes, which are products of credit creation… The prime factor in generating the inflation of the 1920s was the increase in total bank reserves” (p.102). In other words, during the 1920s, the United States experienced an inflationary credit boom. This was most evident in the booming stock and the booming real estate markets. Furthermore, there was a “spectacular boom in foreign bonds… It was a direct reflection of American credit expansion, and particularly of the low interest rates generated by that expansion” (p.130). To stem the boom, the Fed attempted in vain to use moral suasion on the markets and restrain credit expansion only for “legitimate business. Importantly, consumer “prices generally remained stable and even fell slightly over the period” (p. 86). No doubt the stable consumer prices contributed to the overall sense of economic stability, and the majority of professional economists then did not realize that the economy was not fundamentally sound. To them the bust came as a surprise.

Today, in a similar fashion, the seeds of Depression are sown in China.  Economists hail the growth of China, many not realizing that China is undergoing an inflationary credit boom that dwarfs that American one during the roaring ‘20s. According to official government statistics, 2002 Chinese GDP growth was 8%, and 2003 growth was 8.5%, and some analysts believe these numbers to be conservative. According to the People’s Bank of China own web site (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/baogaoyutongjishuju/), “Money & Quasi Money Supply” for 2001/01 was 11.89 trillion, for 2002/01 was 15.96 trillion, for 2003/01 was 19.05 trillion, and for 2004/01 was 22.51 trillion yuan. In other words, money supply for 2001, 2002, and 2003 grew respectively 34.2%, 19.3%, and 18.1%. Thus, during the last three years, money supply in China grew approximately three times faster than money supply in the U.S. during the 1920s.

No wonder the Chinese stock market has been booming and the Chinese real estate market is on fire. Just like the U.S. in the 20s, China finances today foreign countries, mostly the U.S., by buying U.S. government bonds with their trade surplus dollars. Just like the Fed’s failed attempts of moral suasion during the 20s, the Chinese government today similarly attempts in vain to curtail growth of credit by providing it only to those industries that need it, that is, only to industries that the government endorses for usually political reasons. Also, for most of the current boom, Chinese consumer prices have been mostly tame and even falling, while prices for raw commodities have been skyrocketing, which perfectly fits the Austrian view that prices of higher-order goods, such as raw materials, should rise relative to prices of lower-order goods, such as consumer goods. This indeed confirms that credit expansion has already been in progress for a considerable time, and that inflation now is in an advanced stage, although it has not yet reached a runaway mode. Thus, economic conditions in China today are strikingly similar to those in America during the 1920s, and the multi-year credit expansion implies that a bust is inevitable.

There are also important parallels regarding currency and export policy. During the 1920s, the British Pound was overvalued and was used by smaller countries as a reserve currency. While Britain ran its inflationary policies during the 1920’s, it was losing gold to other countries, mainly the United States. Therefore, “if the United States government were to inflate American money, Great Britain would no longer lose gold to the United States” (p. 143). Exacerbating the problem further, the Americans artificially stimulated foreign lending, which further strengthened American farm exports, aggravated the net-export problem, and accelerated the gold flow imbalances. “It [foreign lending] also established American trade, not on a solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on a feverish promotion of loans later revealed to be unsound” (p. 139). “[President] Hoover was so enthusiastic about subsidizing foreign loans that he commented later that even bad loans helped American exports and thus provided a cheap form of relief and employment—a cheap form that later brought expensive defaults and financial distress” (p.141) Thus, the preceding discussion makes it clear, that the fundamental reasons behind the American inflationary policy were (1) to check Great Britain’s drains of gold to the United States, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate agricultural exports.

Similarly, today the dollar is overvalued and used as the reserve currency of the world. The U.S. runs its inflationary policy and is losing dollars to the rest of the world, mainly China (and Japan). Today, the currency and export policy of China is anchored around its peg to the dollar. The main reason for this is that by artificially undervaluing its own currency, and therefore overvaluing the dollar, China artificially stimulates its manufacturing exports. The second reason is that by buying the excess U.S. dollars and reinvesting them in U.S. government bonds, it acts as a foreign lender to the United States. The third reason is that this foreign lending stimulates American demand for Chinese manufacturing exports and allows the Chinese government to relieve its current unemployment problems. In other words, the motives behind the Chinese currency and export policy today are identical to the American ones during the 1920s: (1) to support the overvalued U.S. dollar, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate its manufacturing exports. Just like America in the 1920s, China establishes its trade today not on the solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on the basis of foreign loans. No doubt, most of these loans will turn out to be very expensive because they will be repaid with greatly depreciated dollars, which in turn will exacerbate down the road the growing financial distress of the banking sector in China.

Therefore, it is clear that China travels today the road to Depression. How severe this depression will be, will critically depend on two developments. First, how much longer the Chinese government will pursue the inflationary policy, and second how doggedly it will fight the bust. The longer it expands and the more its fights the bust, the more likely it is that the Chinese Depression will turn into a Great Depression. Also, it is important to realize that just like America’s Great Depression in the 1930s triggered a worldwide Depression, similarly a Chinese Depression will trigger a bust in the U.S., and therefore a recession in the rest of the world.

Unless there is an unforeseen banking, currency, or a derivative crisis spreading throughout the world, it is my belief that the Chinese bust will occur sometime in 2008-2009, since the Chinese government will surely pursue expansionary policies until the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in China. By then, inflation will be most likely out of control, probably already in runaway mode, and the government will have no choice but to slam the brakes and induce contraction. In 1929 the expansion stopped in July, the stock market broke in October, and the economy collapsed in early 1930. Thus, providing for a latency period of approximately half a year between credit contraction and economic collapse, based on my Olympic Games timing, I would pinpoint the bust for 2009. Admittedly, this is a pure speculation on my part; naturally, the bust could occur sooner or later.

While I base my timing of bust on the 2008 Olympic Games, Marc Faber, the foremost Austrian authority in the world on Chinese economic development, believes that the bust will occur sooner. According to him, the U.S. is due for a meaningful recession relatively soon, which in turn will exacerbate already existing manufacturing overcapacities in China. This, coupled with growing credit problems, makes him believe that China will tip into recession sooner than the Olympic Games. In other words, Dr. Faber believes that a U.S. recession will trigger the Depression in China. Indeed, that very well may be the trigger, but if so, it still remains to be seen whether the Chinese government will let the bust run its course or choose the route of a “crack-up” boom, come hell or high water.

We should also consider another possible trigger for a bust, namely trade surpluses turning into trade deficits due to the accelerated rise of prices for resources, such as commodities, which China must import. Faced with trade deficits, China may decide to dishoard surpluses by selling U.S. government bonds, or it may decide to abandon its peg to the dollar. In either case, this will exacerbate the problems of the ailing U.S. economy, which in turn will boomerang back to China.

Finally, the bust may be triggered by a worldwide crisis in crude oil supplies. Peak oil supply is around the corner, if not already behind us, and Middle East or Caspian instability could sharply cut oil supplies. Historically, oil shortages and their concomitant rise of oil prices have always induced a recession. China’s growing dependence on oil ensures that should an oil crisis occur, it will slip into recession.

To summarize, the likely candidates for a trigger to the Chinese depression are (1) a worldwide currency, banking, or derivatives crisis, (2) a U.S. recession, (3) the containment of runaway inflation, (4) the disappearance of Chinese trade surpluses, and (5) an oil supply crisis.

Whatever the trigger of the bust in China, there is little doubt that this will provide the onset of a worldwide depression. Just like the U.S. emerged from the Great Depression as the unrivalled superpower of the world, so it is likely that China will emerge as the next.

© 2004 Krassimir Petrov, Ph.D.

瞭望东方周刊－－－－印度国力定将超中国(转载)印度国力定将超中国 人口持续增长是主因　　
　　2009年09月21日 15:21瞭望东方周刊　　
　　北京大学中国经济研究中心副主任姚洋　　
　　在过去一年里，金融危机发生之后，我们听到很多关于中国和世界脱钩的问题，我想告诉大家的是，中国是国际分工的一部分，中国从国际分工里实际上是得到好处的，分工不仅仅是对美国有利，对中国也有利。当然这其中会产生很多问题，也就是所谓全球失衡的问题，那我们怎么来应对这个问题呢？中国经济增长模式的负面作用到底是什么，如何去矫正呢？
　　听到最多的矫正方法是，增加国内消费，减少出口，减少对出口的依赖。我觉得这样一个政策建议，首先是没有理解我们为什么会有出口导向的发展模式；其次是没有抓住问题的根本，所以才不可能见效。这里我谈一下自己的看法，我们如何来降低经济增长模式的负面作用。
　　中国经济模式的两大特点
　　中国经济增长模式有两个特点，第一个是出口导向。出口导向的经济增长模式是上个世纪80年代中期确立的，有两个理论支持出口导向的增长模式，一个是所谓的“梯度理论”，也就是说把全国分成梯度：沿海地区、中东部地区、西部地区，我们应该先发展沿海地区，然后根据梯度慢慢发展中东部地区，再发展西部地区，这是为出口导向政策奠定了一个基础；第二个理论支持是所谓的“大进大出”理论，其实就是搞出口加工业，进口原材料，在中国组装生产，然后再出口。这两个理论奠定了我们出口导向政策。
　　另外一个很重要的原因是，我们周边的国家和地区通过采纳出口导向型增长模式经济都增长非常快，比如说亚洲四小龙：韩国、中国台湾、中国香港、新加坡，还有稍后崛起的所谓新兴化国家，他们的增长对我们有很大的启示。
　　再有一个原因，是20世纪80年代中国和美国的结盟，这点非常重要。邓小平主政之后第一个正式访问的国家就是美国，访美时记者问他，你当了副总理第一个访问的国家为什么选择美国？邓小平说了意味深长的两句话，他说，你们看战后凡是跟着美国走的都富裕起来了，战后凡是跟美国作对的都还很穷。
　　这些都奠定了我们在80年代的基调。美国也是投桃报李，帮中国进入反苏联盟，然后给中国一个很重要的待遇——最惠国待遇。最惠国待遇意味着什么呢？我们对美出口可以享受美国给任何一个其他国家的优惠条件，比如说它对法国的关税率只有5%，那么中国的关税率也必须是5%，这对中国出口的快速增长起了关键性作用。
　　实际上如果我们说16、17世纪西方世界的崛起是搭上了亚洲，特别是中国和印度经济增长的快车的话，那么现在则是中国搭上了美国所构造的资本主义世界体系的快车，全球范围内认识到这点非常重要，就是说中国是现存世界体制的受益者。当然我们也应该看到2001年入世之后中国的出口加速。90年代或更早的时候，贸易的增长速度每年只有百分之十几，2001年之后增长速度突然加倍，完全融入世界体系，给中国带来的好处是无与伦比的。
　　第二个特点是高投资低消费。我们的投资率一直是在30%~40%，储蓄率当然更高了，过去这几年总储蓄率高达52%，也即是说我们创造的GDP的一半以上都给存起来了。但是投资率只有42%，这意味着还有将近10%的储蓄没有用起来，没用起来的部分就变成了国家的外汇储备，给外国人花了。这就是我要说的，我们有浪费性的储蓄。当然，如果投资率很高，反过来消费占的比重就低。在过去的30年间，我们的消费从占整个GDP的70%下降到现在的48%。这其中居民的消费量只有32%左右，其他16%实际上是政府消费贡献的，也就是说相对而言老百姓还是很穷的。这就是我们国家经济增长模式的两大特点。
　　为什么会选择这样的经济模式
　　我们为什么会产生这样的增长模式呢？我想告诉大家的是，我们的增长模式是跟人口结构、劳动力结构息息相关的，也就是说这样一个增长模式是有经济学道理的。
　　那我国的人口特点是什么呢？第一是巨大的农村人口。第二是城市化水平很低。低是和世界平均水平来比较的。举个例子，菲律宾的人均收入是2200美元，我们的人均收入是3400美元，但菲律宾的城市化率是55%，而我国的城市化率只有45%；第三是较低的人口抚养比。什么是人口抚养比？就是不劳动的人口除以劳动人口，不劳动人口是指16岁以下和60岁以上的。中国的人口抚养比是0.4，也就说一个劳动力只负担0.4个非劳动力，是全世界最低的国家之一。美国、印度都是0.6。
　　以上的三个条件加起来就会造成三个后果。第一劳动力供给非常充裕；第二劳动力工资上涨比较慢；第三劳动者的收入占GDP的比重不可能上涨，甚至可能下降，这就意味着国内市场比较小。这三个结果要求我们必须依靠出口。工厂需要一定的规模经济，中国造的鞋占全球70%~80%，也就是说中国造的鞋供全世界消费是没有问题的。因为这有个规模经济在其中。中国由于狭小的市场我们必须出口，所以在这个意义上说，中国选择出口导向型经济模式是不得已而为之的。不得已在经济学上来说就是合理的，而且是最佳的选择。
　　刚才所讲到的是国民收入支出的部分，下面要讲的是收入部分。从收入部分看，劳动者收入在进入21世纪之后就一直在下降，下降12%。而资本的收入在上升，利润率在上升。另外政府的税收所占的比重在上升。这是我们国家很重要的特点。这意味着什么？意味着老百姓相对变穷了。老百姓收入的绝对数字是在增加，人均收入每年是以6%、7%的速度在增长，但是增长速度却低于GDP的增长速度，GDP的增长速度每年达到9%以上。
　　劳动收入比重下降的后果是什么？就是消费少了。我们知道资本收入有很大一部分又重新投回生产中，或者被企业家分红，但企业家都是较富裕的一群人，我们知道越富有的人，他的平均消费占的比重就越低。比如说世界上最富有的人是比尔·盖茨，他的年收入应该有四五亿美元，而他每年的消费有多少呢？满打满算有5000万，可以看出消费占他收入是很小的一部分。但一个穷人他的消费占他收入的多少呢？90%，甚至更高，有些人是负债生活。所以说穷人更多的收入会被消费掉，富人有更多的收入储蓄起来。
　　工薪阶层收入占的比重相对在下降，结果造成消费占GDP的比重在下降。我们国家的国内市场相对来说是比较小的，储蓄率就会上升。要知道中国多数的储蓄不是老百姓增加的，特别是这几年，存量是老百姓占的最多，增量部分主要是企业和政府带来的，而不是老百姓带来的。还要纠正大家的一个看法，中国的老百姓特别愿意存钱，事实上不是这样的。我国老百姓的储蓄率与印度差别不大，居民储蓄约占GDP的20%。主要是政府和企业储蓄高。这些年政府和企业的收入增长非常快。2007年，北京市税收的增长是45%，一年增长了将近一半，到12月份税收就不收了，收了的话增长可能更多。这种状况对我国经济结构的两个特点影响非常大。
　　印度和中国采用了不同的发展模式，我们听到的说法是，印度是世界的办公室，中国是世界的工厂。印度人听了特别高兴，因为他们比中国高级，中国是给世界打工的，我们是给世界服务的。这都是胡说。印度所谓的高科技产业占GDP的比重不足5%，雇用的人数不超过5%，倒是服务业占GDP的55%左右。印度40%的人不识字，而中国识字率达到92%。实际上印度没有搞制造业不是因为他不想搞，而是想搞而搞不了。因为印度没有我们国家这么好的劳动大军。我想告诉大家的是，印度和中国只不过是处在不同的发展阶段而已，从收入、人口结构都处在不同的发展阶段，虽然在同一条发展的曲线上，但却在不同的阶段上。印度最终还是会跟随中国走，特别是它想经济高速发展的话，最后必定会走上中国这条路。这是我的一个判断。
　　1979年中国开始实施计划生育政策，人口急刹车，使得我们人口红利的窗口变得非常窄小，这项政策到现在已经有30年了，通常估计还有15年左右的时间，也就是到2035年我国的人口是要下降的。如果真的发生的话，对中华民族的影响是空前绝后的。日本人口在下降，现在的人口是1.2亿，如果不做改变的话，到2050年日本人口只有8000万。我们总说日本的挑战，我觉得日本对中国绝对构不成挑战，它是个衰落的国家。为什么美国还能保持世界霸主地位？很重要的一点就是它是发达国家里唯一一个人口正增长的国家。看人口的增长，主要指标是妇女的总和生育率，也就是一个妇女一生生几个孩子。
　　现在中国一个妇女一生只生1.8个孩子，而很多人口学家说只有1.6个，这是非常危险的。美国妇女的总和生育率是2.2，对于一个国家、一个民族保持活力保持人口增长非常重要。看英国，国力增长的时候都是人口在增长的时候，而衰落的阶段也都是人口下降的阶段。英国是个老牌资本主义国家，经历了资本主义发展的所有阶段，英国所谓人口红利阶段，即人口转型的第二阶段，较高的出生率和较低的死亡率持续了150年。估计印度也会持续100年，在这个意义上印度会超过中国，就因为它的人口。
　　在本世纪下半段，印度肯定要超过中国。很多人认为印度赶超中国是因为他的制度，我不认为如此，因为制度在长时间段里是中性的，中性的意思是大家都会学，中国在过去30年里学了多少制度，只要肯变就能学，但人口是学不来的。中国经济研究中心一直在鼓吹中国要改变现在的计划生育政策，要从现在开始，不能等再过10年人口快下降的时候再改，那来不及了，到那个时候大家都不生了。现在如果夫妻双方都是独生子女的话可以生两个孩子，但是问问周围有几个人想生两个的。哈尔滨做过一个调查，调查夫妻双方都是独生子女的有多少人愿意生两个孩子，结果是几乎没有。因此现在放开计划生育政策，对我们整个国家是一个非常重大的决策。