斗鱼女主播在哪可以看:FT及摩根大通解读欧元区峰会声明草案 | 华尔街见闻 （转载）

根据21日欧元区峰会的泄密版草案，以下是金融时报逐一解读草案对第二次援助希腊、主权违约、危机传染、欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）表明的态度。同时，摩根大通经济学家也发表了对此的看法。

1、首先以希腊得到的新一批援助开始：

3. We have decided to lengthen the maturity of the EFSF loans to Greece to the maximum extent possible from the current 7.5 years to a minimum of 15 years. In this context, we will ensure adequate post programme monitoring. We will provide EFSF loans at lending rates equivalent to those of the Balance of Payment facility (currently approx. 3.5%) without going below the EFSF funding cost. This will be accompanied by a mechanism which ensures appropriate incentives to implement the programme, including through collateral arrangements where appropriate.

解读：这是一种下属官方债权人对私人投资者的模式，不过在这里EFSF的地位是同级。值得一提的是，原本欧盟给予希腊的贷款是3年期限，而对于IMF提供的贷款，IMF自己也没有要求延长偿还期。

国际收支平衡（BoP）机制是2009年给罗马尼亚和保加利亚开出的药方。这会不会有点冒险，可能会导致希腊贷款率下降呢？因为推出BoP是为了援助那些欧元区以外地区面临货币问题的国家，更别提它着力于流动性，而不是偿债的能力。

该条款最后提到“包括通过适当地方的抵押担保协议”，这无疑是在向芬兰妥协。但这也让人怀疑，官方债权人怎样能在至少15年时间里监督希腊呢？

2、下面来看——主权违约的进展：

5. Greece is in a uniquely grave situation in the Euro area. This is the reason why it requires an exceptional solution. The financial sector has indicated its willingness to support Greece on a voluntary basis through a menu of options (bond exchange, roll-over, and buyback) at lending conditions comparable to public support with credit enhancement.

6. All other Euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms. The Euro area Heads of States or Government fully support this determination as the credibility of all their sovereign signatures is a decisive element for ensuring financial stability in the Euro area as a whole.

解读：希腊与爱尔兰总理的观点没有多大差别：这是欧洲的问题。这些条款提出的选择看似含糊，但这是在正常情况下得到一个债务重组的机会。假如“贷款条件”类似于官方贷款，那么到期的债券会怎样？它们也会延期到15年后吗？利率降低到3.5%，很多信用增强措施都需要保持净现值中性。这里没有直接提到要怎么处理希腊银行和欧洲央行的抵押担保，实在让人惊讶。承诺了由EFSF做抵押替代工具，这很有意义。

第6条似乎是某一方热衷于从各成员国那里得到不会违约的承诺，确认了这是一个“零违约”货币联盟。

3、EFSF与危机传染

7. To improve the effectiveness of the EFSF and address contagion, we agree to increase the flexibility of the EFSF, allowing it to:

- intervene on the basis of a precautionary programme, with adequate conditionality;

- finance recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans to governments including in non programme countries;

- intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing the existence of exceptional circumstances and a unanimous decision of the EFSF Member States.

解读：市场需要一段时间来消化这些改变，改动的范围很广。不妨这样说，这些EFSF动用的“次级援助”很吃紧，而且，主权国家难道就希望让人看见自己受到死亡威胁吗。这其中的道理就像是说葡萄牙在“抵制”EFSF提供援助一样。

同样地，一种预警贷款可能会在意大利遭遇“流动性”危机时派上用场，但意大利债务太棘手，很快就会恶化为偿债能力问题。而且，如果众所周知，意大利太庞大，无法适当担保EFSF，这种贷款本身也许就会让市场形成恐慌。

这也是EFSF购买债券条款中的根本问题。这种授权仅限于“异常”环境。欧洲央行暗示，永远不会透露二级市场干预的动机。这是在锁定目标、拉低收益率吗？如果是在意大利，流动性会是触媒吗？如果投资者只利用EFSF作为一种便利的逃跑途径，那么流动性的状况就会恶化。

4、最后看看西班牙和意大利。

9. All euro area Member States will adhere strictly to the agreed fiscal targets, improve competitiveness and address macro-economic imbalances. Deficits in all countries except those under a programme will be brought below 3% by 2013 at the latest. In this context, we welcome the budgetary package recently presented by the Italian government which will enable it to bring the deficit below 3% in 2012 and to achieve balance budget in 2014. We also welcome the ambitious reforms undertaken by Spain in the fiscal, financial and structural area. As a follow up to the results of bank stress tests, Member States will provide backstops to banks as appropriate…

解读：这是关于希腊的声明，但也是有关意大利和西班牙的最高级别声明。

摩根大通驻伦敦经济学家David Mackie认为：

草案清楚地表明德国坚持自己的私人部门参与援助方面的立场，不过欧洲央行强烈反对。这已经是众人皆知的秘密，这符合新的欧洲稳定机制（ESM）协议怎样体现地区发挥功能的方式。关键的问题是，以限制危机传染为目的的援助方案措施能否奏效。如果不能，就会随后出现更多的社会化现象。决策者已经明确地决定，现在反对欧洲债券，但这仍然是最后时刻的政治选择，只有在其他一切方法都无法平息市场之时才会选用。