胡笳源于什么时期:巴菲特《财富杂志》文章中英：股市长期回报优于黄金和债券

(2012-02-13 14:45:12)
标签：财经
分类：转载关于巴菲特的文章
巴菲特：股市长期回报优于黄金和债券
作者: Warren Buffett    时间: 2012年02月10日    来源:财富中文网
本文改编自“奥马哈先知”沃伦?巴菲特将于近期发布的致股东信，且听股神如何解释为何股票长期回报率总是高于其他投资品种。
http://www.fortunechina.com/investing/c/2012-02/10/content_89121.htm
http://www.fortunechina.com/investing/c/2012-02/13/content_89263.htm
投资往往为被描述为这样一个过程，现在投入一些钱，希望未来能收回更多的钱。在伯克希尔哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway），我们采用更高的标准，将投资定义为“现在将购买力让渡给他人，合理期待未来支付明义收益税率后，仍能获得更高的购买力”。简言之，投资就是放弃现在的消费，以便将来有能力消费更多。
从我们的定义可以得出一个重要结论：衡量投资风险高低的指标不应是贝塔值（一个基于波动率的华尔街术语，常用于衡量风险），而是持有期满后投资人出现购买力损失的（合理）概率。资产价格可能大幅波动，但只要有理由肯定投资期满后它们带来的购买力能得到提升，这项投资就没有风险。稍后我们还会看到，价格没有波动的资产也可能充满风险。
投资选择林林总总，但大体可分为三类，理解每一类的特点很重要。下面，我们将展开详细的分析。
市场上以特定货币结算的投资包括货币市场基金、债券、按揭、银行存款和其他工具。大多数此类投资都被视为“安全”，但事实上却是可能属于最危险的资产。它们的贝塔值可能是零，但风险巨大。
上个世纪，这类投资工具摧毁了很多国家投资者的购买力，尽管投资者一直能够按时收到支付的本息。而且，这样的糟糕结果将来还会不断重现。政府决定货币的最终价值，而系统性力量有时会推动它们制定导致通胀的政策。这些政策一不留神就会失控。
即使是在美国，政府强烈希望维持本币稳定，但是，我1965年接管伯克希尔哈撒韦以来，美元也已贬值高达86%。当年花1美元能买到的东西，今天至少要花7美元。因此，这些年来，一个免税机构须取得4.3%的债券投资年收益，才能保持购买力不变。假如管理层还将一切利息收入视为“收益”，他们一定是在开玩笑。
对于像你我这样的应税投资者，情况就更糟了。过去的四十七里，美国国债不断地滚动，年回报率5.7%。听起来好像还不错。但对于个人所得税率平均为25%的的个人投资者而言，这5.7%的回报率所能带来的实际收益是零。投资者缴纳的、可见的所得税将拿走上述回报率中的1.4个百分点，通胀因素这个隐形的“税种”将吞噬其余4.3个百分点。值得指出的是，尽管投资者可能认为显性的所得税是主要的负担，但其实，隐形的通胀“税”是所得税的三倍还多。没错，每张美元上都印着“我们信仰上帝”这句话，但启动美国政府印钞机的是凡夫俗子的手。
当然，高利率能弥补依托于货币的投资工具所带来的通胀风险。而且，20世纪80年代初时的利率确实很好地做到了这一点。不过，要抵消消费者购买力面临的风险，当前的利率水平还差得远。因此，眼下应谨慎投资债券。
在目前的环境下，我不看好依托于货币的投资。不过，伯克希尔持有的这类投资仍然达到了相当的数额，其中主要是短期品种。不管实际利率水平是多么低，在伯克希尔，对充足流动性的需求总是被置于极其重要的地位，将来其重要性也不会降低。为满足这一需求，我们主要持有美国国债——即便是在最混乱的经济环境下，美国国债也是唯一靠得住的投资品种。我们正常的流动性水平是200亿美元；100亿美元是我们的绝对下限。
抛开流动性和监管要求，我们一般不愿购买基于货币的证券，除非它们有可能提供超乎寻常的收益——原因可能是在间歇的垃圾债券暴跌期，某只公司债定价过低；也可能是因为利率已升至高位，如果利率下跌，高评级债券有可能实现大幅资本升值。过去，这两类机会我们都抓到过——未来也可能再次抓住这样的机会——但当前我们与这样的前景显然背道而驰。今日的情形正如华尔街人士谢尔比?库洛姆?戴维斯多年前的一句俏皮话所言：“以如今的价格，宣称提供无风险回报的债券实际提供的是无回报的风险。
第二类投资指的是永远也不会有产出的资产，投资者买入时只是希望其他投资者——这些人同样也明白这类资产永远都不会有产出——将来会以更高的价格接手。最典型的就是郁金香，17世纪时，它一度成为此类买家的最爱。
这类投资需要买家群体不断壮大，而人们之所以决定买入，是因为他们相信未来买家群体还会继续壮大。这类资产的持有者并不指望资产本身能有什么产出——它永远都不会有产出——而是相信未来，别人会更迫切地希望接手。
这类资产中的一个大类就是黄金，它当前极受避险投资者的追捧。这些投资者对其他几乎所有资产都不放心，特别是纸币（正如前述，鉴于纸币的购买力，他们的担心不无道理）。不过，黄金有两个显著的缺点。它用途优先，也不能自我繁殖。的确，黄金有一些工业和装饰用途，但这些用途的需求有限，不足以消化新的产量。而且，如果某个投资者一直持有一盎司黄金，最终依然还是只持有一盎司黄金。
大多数投资者买入黄金是因为他们相信上述担心会升级。过去十年证明这一信念是正确的。此后，金价的继续走高是源于这波走势激发的、更旺盛的购买热情，很多人都将金价上涨视为这种投资观点得到了验证。随着“跟风”投资者的涌入，他们短期内会建立起自己的真理。
起初合理的投资逻辑加上反复炒作的价格上涨便能造就巨大的资产泡沫，过去15年里我们看到的互联网泡沫和楼市泡沫便是典型。在这些泡沫中，很多最初持怀疑态度的投资者最终都向市场给出的“证据”低了头，一时之间买家群体飞速扩张，足以维持泡沫的继续膨胀。但泡沫大到一定程度，总是免不了会破灭。真是应了那句老话：“聪明人起头，傻瓜结尾”（What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end）。
今天，全球的黄金库存有约17万公吨。所有这些黄金熔合在一起会形成一个边长68英尺的立方体。（想象一下，差不多正好能够放入一个棒球场内场。）以每盎司1,750美元（此文撰写时的金价）计算，它的市值约为9.6万亿美元。我们将这个立方体称为A组。
现在，我们用同样金额创建一个B组。我们可以买下美国所有的耕地（4亿英亩，年产值约2,000亿美元）和16家埃克森美孚（Exxon Mobils）（全球最赚钱的公司，每年利润额超过400亿美元）。然后，还剩下约1万亿美元可用作活动资金（因此，就算这样大手笔的投资后，也丝毫不会感到手头紧张）。你认为一个拥有9.6万亿美元的投资者会选择A组，还是B组？
除了库存黄金的惊人市值，当前居高不下的金价也让如今的黄金年产值达到了约1,600亿美元。买家——不管是珠宝制造商、工业用户，心存恐惧的个人，还是投机者——必须不断地消化增加的供应，才能让金价继续在当前水平保持均衡。
从现在开始往后推100年，其间，4亿英亩农田将产出无数的玉米、小麦、棉花和其他作物。而且不论我们采取什么作为货币，它都会继续带来这样丰富的物产。而埃克森美孚可能已向股东派发了几万亿美元的股息，且持有资产规模还在进一步扩大（记住，选B组的投资者手头拥有16家埃克森美孚）。100年内 17万吨黄金的大小不会有丝毫变化，而且依然不会有任何产出。当然，你可以抚弄这个黄金立方体，但它不会有反应。
不可否认，100年后，当人们感到害怕时，很多人可能还是会抢购黄金。但我相信，A组的当前市值9.6万亿美元在这100年内的复合增长率将远逊于B组。
市场的恐惧心理达到顶点时，第一、第二类投资最受追捧：经济崩溃担忧会促使人们买入依托于货币的资产，主要是美国债券；货币贬值担忧会让人们购入黄金等无产出资产。2008年底时我们听说“现金为王”，但事实上当时本应积极投资，而非持币观望。同样，20世纪80年代初时我们又听说“现金是垃圾”，但事实上当时的固定美元投资处于我们记忆中最具吸引力的水平。这两次，跟风投资者们为求心安，都付出了沉重代价。
我自己最看好的——你知道，接下来我们就要谈到了——是第三类投资：投资产出性资产，不管是企业、农场，还是房地产。理想的话，在通胀时期，这些资产只需最低水平的新资本投入，就能通过产出保持购买力价值。农场、房地产和许多企业，比如可口可乐（Coca-Cola）、IBM以及我们自己的See's Candy都属于这样的优质资产。其他有些公司——比如受管制的公用事业公司——则稍逊一筹，因为通胀会给它们带来沉重的资本投资负担。为增加盈利，这些公司必须扩大投入。即便如此，这类公司还是优于无产出投资或基于货币的投资。
不管100年后货币的形式是黄金、贝壳、鲨鱼牙，还是今天这样的纸币，人们还是会愿意用几分钟日常劳动，换取一罐可口可乐或一些See's的花生薄脆糖。未来美国人将运输更多商品、消费更多食品并需要更大的居住空间。人们永远需要将自己生产的东西与别人进行交换。
美国企业将继续高效地生产出美国人需要的商品和服务。打个比方，这些商业“奶牛”将存活几百年，产出更多的“牛奶”。决定它们价值高低的不是交换介质，而是它们的产奶能力。对于奶牛主而言，卖奶收入将呈复合增长，就像20世纪一样，琼斯指数从66点增长到了11,497点（与此同时，还支付了大笔股息）。
伯克希尔的目标将是增加对一流企业的持股。我们首选全盘持股——但也会通过持有相当数量的可售股票成为股东。我相信在任何一个较长时期内，这类投资都将证明是我们所分析的三类投资中遥遥领先的优胜者。更重要的是，它也将远比其他两类投资安全。
译者：zdm
Warren Buffett: Why stocks beat gold and bonds
February 9, 2012: 5:00 AM ET
In an adaptation from his upcoming shareholder letter, the Oracle of Omaha explains why equities almost always beat the alternatives over time.
ByWarren Buffett
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/09/warren-buffett-berkshire-shareholder-letter/
FORTUNE -- Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power -- after taxes have been paid on nominal gains -- in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.
From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability -- the reasoned probability -- of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a nonfluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it's important to understand the characteristics of each. So let's survey the field.
Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as "safe." In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power ofinvestors in many countries, even as these holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as "income."
For taxpaying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation "tax" was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. "In God We Trust" may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments -- and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely.Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
Warren Buffett: Your pick for Businessperson of the Year
Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily holdU.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain -- either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past -- and may do so again -- we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: "Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk."
The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else -- who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive -- will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce -- it will remain lifeless forever -- but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.
The major asset in this category is gold, currentlya huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth -- for a while.
Over the past 15 years, bothInternet stocks andhouses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the "proof " delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers -- for a time -- expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: "What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end."
Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce -- gold's price as I write this -- its value would be about $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers -- whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators -- must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops -- and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil (XOM) will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely manywill still rush to gold. I'm confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.
Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assetssuch as gold. We heard "cash is king" in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard "cash is trash" in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.
My own preference -- and you knew this was coming -- is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola (KO),IBM (IBM), and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies -- think of our regulated utilities, for example -- fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.
Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial "cows" will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of "milk" to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well).
Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety -- but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
This article is from the February 27, 2012 issue of Fortune.
Posted in:Berkshire Hathaway,Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter,bonds,gold,investing,stocks,Warren Buffett