告别“金砖四国”标签 It’s time to look beyond the Brics

It’s time to bid farewell to the Brics. Rolling China, India, Brazil and Russia into a clever acronym once offered an easy description of the redistribution of global power. But slotting rising states into neat categories betrays a western-centric world view that now obscures more than it illuminates.

到了与“金砖四国”(Brics)标签说再见的时候了。Brics一词将中国、印度、巴西和俄罗斯这四个国家的英文名称首字母巧妙地组合在一起，顺畅地描绘出了全球权力再分配状况。然而将崛起中的国家简单地分门别类，有违一种以西方为核心的世界观——眼下，与其说这种世界观更具市场，倒不如说它正渐失影响力。

For one thing, they are not all the same. United by impressive economic growth rates, the Brics are divided by politics: two authoritarian regimes sit alongside two democracies. Even then, Beijing and Moscow look uncomfortable bedfellows. Points of stress (think of Russia’s emptying and resource-rich east) are easier to identify than coincidences of strategic interest.

首先，金砖四国并非完全相同。虽然经济增长迅猛是它们的共同特点，但政治状况却各不相同：其中包括两个威权国家和两个民主国家。即便如此，中国和俄罗斯似乎也是同床异梦。人们似乎更容易找出存在紧张关系的地方（不妨想想地广人稀、蕴含着丰富资源的俄罗斯东部），而不是双方在战略利益上一致的地方。

Corralled by a set of economic indicators, the group excludes other important players. What about Indonesia and Mexico, or for that matter, Argentina or Vietnam? True, the Brics sometimes hold meetings, but the absence from the original formulation of the entire African continent has obliged them to give South Africa a seat at the table.

局限于一系列经济指标，金砖四国把其他重要国家排除在外。印尼和墨西哥如何？或者说阿根廷和越南又怎样？诚然，金砖四国有时会召开会议，不过由于一开始没有按照最初的构想涵盖整个非洲大陆，因此它们最终让南非加入了进来。

The relationship between economic weight and political heft is not invariably symmetrical. Anyone with half an eye on the Middle East, for example, will have noticed Turkey’s emergence as the pivotal regional power. This is partly a reflection of its vibrant economy, but Turkey’s real pitch is as a political role model for the Arab world.

经济影响力与政治分量之间的关系并不总是对称的。比如，任何对中东局势稍有关注的人，都会注意到土耳其已崛起为一支重要的区域强国。这在某种程度上体现了该国的经济活力，但土耳其真正的分量，在于它在阿拉伯世界中所起到的政治表率作用。

Russia’s inclusion in the grouping was always an anomaly. Oil and gas produce good headline growth rates. On every other economic, social and demographic measure, Russia is a power in secular decline.

俄罗斯被纳入金砖四国一事向来令人费解。石油和天然气造就了该国不俗的总体经济增长。但以经济、社会乃至人口领域的所有其他指标衡量，俄罗斯却是一个出于长期没落中的大国。

The Brics concept is one-dimensional. It defies the complexities of the shifts in power and interests in the international system. To lump together China and India, Brazil and Russia is to nourish a facile narrative that the new global order is best defined as a contest between the west and the rest.

“金砖四国”是一种一维概念。它忽略了国际体系中权力和利益转移的复杂性。为了拉拢中国和印度，巴西和俄罗斯要支持一种肤浅的说法，即全球新秩序的最佳定义是：一场西方与其他国家之间的竞赛。

I was reminded of this at a recent conference in Stockholm hosted by the German Marshall Fund. The gathering brought together a cross-section of the Indian elite with their counterparts from the US and Europe. And guess what? The relationship the Indian side wanted to talk – and worry – about was the one with China.

我在德国马歇尔基金会(German Marshall Fund)最近于斯德哥尔摩举办的一场会议上想到了这一点。与会者包括印度以及欧美的各行业精英人士。能想到吗？印度与会者想要谈论——也是他们所担心——的，是印度与中国之间的关系。

India sees China as an ever-present danger. Hundreds of thousands of Indian and Chinese troops face each other every day across a disputed border stretching thousands of miles. An unexpected provocation or miscalculation, I heard one Indian policymaker say, could quite easily trigger war.

印度将中国视为一个始终存在的威胁。在绵延数千英里、存在争议的中印边境线上，每天都有数十万名中印军人严阵以待。我曾听一位印度决策者说，一次意外的挑衅或误判，就很可能引发战争。

Others observed that Beijing nurtures a close relationship with Pakistan in order to contain India. Westerners should not be misled by the rapid pace of economic integration between India and China. Shared economic interests have proved an unreliable safeguard against conflict – witness Germany and Britain in 1914.

还有人注意到，北京方面精心培育与巴基斯坦之间的密切关系，以便牵制印度。西方人士不会被中印经济的快速融合所迷惑。事实证明，共同的经济利益并不能成为避免冲突的可靠保障——不妨想一想1914年的德国和英国。

Beijing would doubtless offer a different perspective, but the rights and wrongs are beside the point. The important message is that the dynamics of the new world order are driven as much by rivalries between rising powers as by how they get along with the west. India’s big strategic decision in recent years has been to move closer to Washington. The US backs its bid for a permanent place on the UN Security Council. China opposes it.

北京方面无疑会提供一个不同的视角，但其中的是非曲直与此无关。重要的讯息是：推动世界新秩序发生变化的因素不仅有崛起大国之间的较量，还有它们将如何与西方相处。近年来，印度一个重大战略决定是向华盛顿靠拢。美国支持印度谋求成为联合国安理会(UN Security Council)常任理事国的努力，而中国则予以反对。

Brazil is fortunate not to have serious enemies. Its international aspirations fall into what policymakers call the soft power category. Proud of its democracy, it wants to make friends and influence people. Antonio Patriota, the country’s bright young foreign minister, boasts that Brazil now has more embassies in Africa than Britain. A creaking North Atlantic community may soon find it has a more vibrant southern rival. Elsewhere, Brazilia has teamed up with Ankara in an effort to mediate in the stand-off about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

巴西是幸运的，它没有真正意义上的敌人。该国的国际理想可以归为决策者所称的软实力一类。以自身民主为荣的巴西希望广交朋友，并对人们产生影响。年轻有为的巴西外交部长帕特里奥塔(Antonio Patriota)夸口称，目前巴西在非洲的大使馆数量比英国还要多。摇摇欲坠的北大西洋共同体或许不久就会发现，自己有了一个更加活跃的南半球对手。在其他地方，巴西与土耳其一道，在伊朗核计划引发的僵局中展开了斡旋。

All this leaves Brazil uncomfortable with any perception that it cuddles up to China and Russia. Sure, there is serious business to be done with Beijing – China has been the motor of Brazil’s economic growth. But Brazil is happier in the company of India and South Africa. These three rising democracies have coined their own acronym – Ibsa.

凡此种种，使得巴西对于任何认为它在有意亲近中国和俄罗斯的看法都感到不快。当然，它和北京之间有重要的事情要做——中国已成为巴西经济增长的引擎。不过巴西与印度和南非在一起时，幸福感会更高。这三个崛起中的民主国家已经有了自己的首字母缩略词——Ibsa。

President Barack Obama’s recent swing through Australasia tells something of the same story of geopolitical complexity. The region’s rising states may be united in challenging the economic hegemony of the west, but Vietnam and Indonesia as well as Japan and South Korea look to the US to check China. There has been plenty of Asian “pull” as well as US “push” in Mr Obama’s drive to reassert America’s Pacific power.

美国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)近日访问澳大利亚时作出的战略调整，某种程度上也反映出了同样的地缘政治复杂性。崛起之中的亚太国家，也许会联合起来挑战西方的经济霸权，但越南、印尼以及日本和韩国则寻求通过美国来制约中国。在奥巴马重塑美国在太平洋地区影响力的过程中，既有美国方面的“推动”，也有亚洲国家的“拉拽”。

One thread does draw together the Brics. They are all pretty much hostile to the idea of intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. So, as it happens, are most of the other rising powers. As the postwar order falls into disrepair, there is scant enthusiasm beyond the west for a new system of global governance. Even here, though, positions are nuanced. Turkey has been closer to the west than to China or Russia in seeking international sanctions against Syria.

金砖四国的确有一点共通之处。它们都不喜欢干预主权国家的内政。其他崛起中的国家大多亦是如此。随着战后秩序的“年久失修”，在西方世界之外，很少有人热衷于构建新的全球治理体系。不过，即便在这个问题上，各方的立场也存在着细微差别。在寻求国际社会对叙利亚实施制裁方面，相比起与中国或俄罗斯，土耳其同西方国家走得更近。

The picture that emerges is one of alliances and rivalries criss-crossing the frontiers of north and south, east and west. Rising states want to do some things together and some things with the west. The geometry is as often set by values as by economic performance. For its part, the US already devotes more energy to cultivating new powers than to tending its old alliance with Europe. There are upheavals aplenty to come before the world has a settled geopolitical landscape. But I can’t see room for the Brics.

目前浮现的画面，所呈现的是一幅纵贯南半球与北半球、横跨东方与西方的联盟与竞争场景。崛起中的国家想联手有所作为，同时也想与西方合作。这种几何图形往往既取决于价值观，同样也取决于经济表现。对美国而言，它已将更多精力投入到培养新的大国伙伴，而不是维护与欧洲的旧有联盟中。在地缘政治格局尘埃落定之前，世界将会经历诸多剧变。但我看不到金砖四国会有什么可供发挥的空间。